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1．　Introduction
　　　　　In　recerit　year8，　iむhas　oftell　been　8aid　that‘theory　of　mindf　is　involved丘n
underetanding　o8tensive　stimuli　in　relevance　theory　Theory　of　mind　i8　the　cognitive
system　of　human　thought“re8pon8ible　fbr　the　irresi8tible　tendency　we　humans　8eem　to
have　to　interpret　each　other’s　behaviour　in　terms　of　the　beliefs，　desires　and　intentio舷8
that　we　take　to　underlie　it”（Car8ton，2000：p，6），　Sperber　and　Wi180n（2002）make　a
propo8al　that　a　submodule　of　theory　of　mind，　which　i8　metarepresentational，　is　closely
related　to　inte1噛preting　ostensive　stimuli．
　　　　　Interpreting　irony　require8　complex　metarepre8entational　hlfbrence　of　thi8
submodule　of　theory　of　mind（Happ6，1993；Curc61995；Gibbs，2000）．　The　cognitive
sy8te皿of　interpreting　irony　is　made　clear　by　p8ycllological　evidence．l　However，　it
seems　that　there　is　sti重l　a　problem　of　how　a　hearer　derives　meaning80f　irony　in　the
framework　of　re玉evance　theory：the　question　of　what　meanings　of　irony　a　hearer
retrieve8　at　the　level　of　explicatures　and　implicature8．2
　　　　　1n　this　paper，　I　wi墨l　deal　with　the　problem　concerning　meanings　of　irony，　that　is，
at　what　level　ofmeaning　a　hearer　recovers　the　attitude　of　diBsociation，　wh主ch　is　gaid　to
be　relevant　to　the　hearer　in　case80f　irony（Sperber　and　Wil80n，1995）．　First，　I　wi11
illustrate　the　relevance－theoretic　view　of　irony　and　Carston’s　propo8al　concerning　the
relation8hip　between　higher－leve玉explicatures　alld　irony　ill　the　next　section．　Then，
cGunter・example8　against　Carston　wiU　be　provided　to　propose　my　idea，　in　which　the
at駐tu〔le　to　the　beliefechoed　is　represented　in　higher－level　explicature801’implicatures，
depending　oll　i皿dividual　ca8e80firo璽1｝r．
2，Irony　in　Relevance－theoretic　Framework
　　　　　In　thi88ection，　I　wiil　de8cribe　what　the　relevance．theoretic　view　of　irony　is，　how　a
hearer　interprets　irony　i’ 氏@Wilson　and　Sperber（1992，1995，1999）befbre　Carston（2000，
2002），and　what　Carston　refbr8　to　as　iガony　in　her　1日test　book．
　　　　　Wilson　and　Sperber　propose　two　main　points　against　tlle　traditional　and　Gricean
view　of　irony．　One　i白that　irolΨis　universal　and　natural：it　should　be　in　every　culture
and　ari8e8白pontaneou81y　without　being　taught　and　learned，　The　other　point　fbcu8e80n
three　fbatures　of　verbal　irony　in　the　relevance．theoretic　framework：
（a）it［iro血y】i8　a　variety　of　inte叩retive　u8e，　in　which　the　propo8ition　expre8sed
by　the　utterance　repre8ent8　a　belief　implic姐y　attributed　by　the　8pe日．ker　to
80meone　else（or　to　her8elf　at　another　t重me）；
（b）it【irony】isθ｛rhoic（i．e．，　it　implicitly　expres8es　the　speaker’8　attitude　to　tlle
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attributed　beliefs）；and
（c）the　attitude　involved　is　one　of　dissocj’intion　from　the　opinions　echoed（Wilson，
1999c：No．8．：p．4）．
　　　　　　How，　then，　doe8　a　hearer　interpret　irony　in　tbe　framework　of　relevance　theory，
according　to　Wil80n　and　Sperber？　In　relevance　theory，　a　hearer　derive8　three　t｝・pe80f
nleaning8：the　proposition　expressed　by　the　utterance，　explicature8，　and　implicatures，
after　decoding　all　uttera皿ce．　However，　it　does　not　seem　clear　what　explicatures　and
impl三cature60f　irony　a　hearer　recover6　in　inむerpreting　an　utterance．　According　to
Wil80n　and　Sperber，　irony　doe8　not　have　basic－level　explicature，　while　other　types　of
utterances　do．　It　ha8　a　propo8ition　expre88ed　by　an　uもterance3　and　only　h三gher－level
explicature，　as　fbllows：
Con8ider　the　ironical（86）：
（86）（a）Peter　i8　quite　well・read．（b）He’s　even　heard　of　Shakespeare．
The　propo8it重onal　fol’m　of（86a）is　the　assumption　that　Peter　i8　quite　wel1－
read．　However，　thi8　i8　not　an　as8umption　that　the　speaker　wants　to　make
manifest；it　is　not　an　exl》licature，　The　only　obvious　explicature　of（86a＞is
（87），where，　as　we　have　already　seen，　one　can　say　that　P　without　asserting
o1’explicat重ng　that」P．
（87）The　speaker　i88aying　thatPeter　i8　quite　we1董一read（1995：pp，224－5）．
It　is　doubtft篭l　that　higller－level　explicature　of　irony　is　only　ttthe　speaker　8ayθthat　P’as
Wilson　and　Sperber　illustrate　above，　A8　fbr　implicature，　Wilson　and　Sperber　do　not　say
clearly　sv　hat　the　implicature80f　irony　are．　The　only　thillg　that　they　explain　is　what
deriving　them　requires：“The　recovery　of　the8e　implicature8　depend8，伽8t，　on　a
recogniむion　of　the　utterance　a8　echoic；8eco聡d，　on　an　identification　of　the　80urce　of　the
opinion　echoed；and　third，　on　a　recognition　that　the　speakeガs　attitude　to　the　opinion
echoed　i8011e　ofrejection　or　di8sociation”（1995二p．240），　However，　it　i8　not　clear　at　what
level　of　meaning　these　task8　are　collducted　and　how　a　hearer　doe8　them，　because　the8e
tasks　are　di脆renぽrom　the　task　of　deriving　implicature　of　other　types　of　utterances．　It
seem8　that　they　are　done　in　the　proce8s　of　taking　the　proposition　expre8eed　by　the
utterance　or　of　taking　lligher－level　explicature，8ince　they　are　requhied　by　the　recovery
of　implicature．　If　this　i8　true，　doe8　the　recegnition　of　the　8peaker’B　attitude　to　the
opinion　echoed　con8truct　a　particular　higher．level　exphcature？It　i8　doubtful　whether
the　above　lligher－level　explicature　is　the　ollly　explicature　or　whether　there　are　a1｝y
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other　higher－level　explicatures，
　　　　　Carston（2002）a（｛dresses　that　question　concerning　the　attitude　to　the　opinion
echoed，　She　Btates　that　in　the　case　of　irony　the　proposition　expressed　i8　no虹
communicated，　which　meanB　that　irony　doe8　not　have　basic　levei　explicatures（p．117，
159）．She　goes　on　to　state　that　irony　has　higher。level　explicatures　as　fbllow8：
The　explicatures　the　utterance　does　have　［of　the　utterance　in（114a）］are　the
higher－level　one8　given　in（114b）and（114c）：
　　　　（114）a．1ピsalovely　day．4
　　　　　　　　b．Tlle　speaker　has　said　tllaもiピs　a　lovely　day，
　　　　　　　　c．The　speaker　thinks　it　is　ridiculous　to　believe／assert　that　it’8　a　lovely
　　　　　　　　　　　day（p，159）．
Any　ilnplicature8　that　the　utterance　may　comlnu皿icate　depen（l　on　the
attitudinal　explicature　in（114c），　f｛）r　in8tance：
　　　　（115）　a．【t’8agha8tly　day．
　　　　　　　　　b，We　can’tpos8ibly　go｛br　a　picnic　today．
　　　　　　　　　c．The　addressee［wllo　predicted　a　lovely　day】ha8　got　it　wrong．
　　　　　　　　　d．The　ad〔lres8ee　is　a　fbolish　optimist（pp．159－60）．
Thi8　clearly　repre8enも8　tllat　higher－level　explicatures　of　irony　illclude　Ilot　only　the
8peech　act　that　is　expresse（l　but　also　all　attitudinal　explicature：the　attitu〔le　to　tlle
opinion　echoed　i8　expres3ed　ill　higher－level　explicaもure8．
3．Explicatures　ofirony
　　　　As　Car8ton　illustrates　above，　in　qases　of　irony　the　attitude　to　the　beliefattributed
to　someone　else　i8　expressed　in　higher－level　explicatures．　However，・it　is　doubtful　that
this　can　be　apPlied　to　every　case　of　iron｝礼
　　　　Consider　the　fbllowing　counter，example：
（1）Oul’fhend8　are　alway8　there　when　they　need　us（quoted　in　Curc6，1995）．
The　utterance　in（1）applies　to　three　fbatures　of　irony　as　defined　above　by～Vilson
（1999c），　Since　Car8ton　define8　interpretively　u8ed　representation　a8“a　repre8entation
（whether　menLal　or　public）which　represents　another　representation（whether　mental
or　public）and　resemhles　it　in　content（logical，　semantic，　conceptual），”the　utterance　is
an　hlterpretive　u8e　of　the　fbllowing　proverb，　which　mean8　that　the　utterance　in（1）
resembles（2）亜ogically（2002：p．377）：
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（2）Our　friends　are　alway8　there　when　we　need　them（Jbid．）．
Curc6　argue8　that　the　utもerance　in（1）i8　an　iron｝7“only　ill　the　context　where－p　is
1血utually　manife8ガ’if　the　propo8ition　of　the　utterance　in（1）i8　taken　a8　P（1995：P．40）．
For　instance，・the　8peaker　of（1），　Mary，　saw　her　frielld，　Peter，　working　late　at　thehr
office　becau8e　of　hi8　mi8take8　and　helped　him　work．　The　next　day　Mary　ha8　to　work
latb　and　want8　Peter．　to　help　her　but　Peter　ha81eft　the　office　Withdut　noticillg　her
working　late，　Wllen　the　speaker　utters（1）in　that　context，　the　utterance　in（1）can　be
con8idered　ironyL　In　that　context，琵i6　echoic　and　the　8peaker　dis80ci日te8　her8elf　from
the　thought　echρed　in（2）．
　　　　In山i8　in8tance　of　irony，　the　proposition　expre88ed　by　the　utterance　might　be
colhmunicated　by　the　utterance．　In　o脚er　words，　the　utterance．ha8　a　ba8ic　Ievel
explicature．　The　relevant　attitude　of　di8sociation，　which　is　con8idered　a　key　point　in
irony」i8　not　the　attitude　to　the．　propo8itiρ耳expre88ed　l）y　the　uttgra轟ce　in（1）but　the
80urce　of　the　thought　echoed　in（2）．　Po8sible　higher一旦evel　explicature　might　be　a8
fbl10W8：
　　a．The　speaker　is　8aying　that　our　friβnds　are　alway3　there　when　they　nee（l　us．
　　b，The　8peaker　believes　that　oul’frie血ds　are　alway8　t｝lerO　when　they　need　u8．
There　i8　no　attitudinal　higher　Ievel　explicature　thatremin（18　u80ftlユe　ironical　attitude，
8uch　a8　expre88ing　rid重cule　and　di8sociation．
　　　　So，　ati　what　level　of　me’aning・does　the　di8sociative　attitude　appea童？In　my　opinion，
it　i8　at　the　level　of　implicature　that　the　attitude　appear8　in　th沁caBe．　One』of　the
implicatures　of　the　utterance　in（1）is　as　fbll6ws：．
（4）It　i8　ridi6’ulous　that　our倉iends　are　alsirays‘　there　wh6n　wb　ne6d　them．
Conbider　the　other　exa「mpIe’Curc6（1995）pro》ides：
（5）．Never　leaVe　until　tomOrrow　what　you　can　po88ibly　do　the　d’ay　after（p．41）．
This　is　O3car　Wilde’s　remark，　which　is　an　interpretive　use　of　the　popular　saying　in（6）．
（6）Never　leave　until　tomorrow　what　you　can　possibly　do　today（」rbid．）。
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The　utterance　in（5）i8　al86　echoic　and　expres8e8　a　di880ciative　a批itu〔le　to　the　thought
echoed　in（6）．　That　is，　ihs　an　irony　However，　it　has　a　basic　Ievel　explicat肌re　and　does
not　expre8s　the　attitude　of　di880ciation　in　higher－level　explica加re8．　Rather，　Wilde
communicate8　dis80ciation　by　the　implicature　below：
（7）It　is　ridiculous　that　you　never　leave　until　tomorrow　what　you　can　possibly　do　today．
In　addition　to　that，　he　might　communicate　other　implicatures，　a8　Curc6　states　thatit　is
absurd‘‘that　e£且ciency　should　be　all　outstan〔ling　value　at　the　expense　of　others，　sa第
more　e！notional　or　8en8ual　experiellce8”（1995：P．41）．
　　　　　111the　above　two　example8，　the　utterances　have　basic　level　explicatures
although　they　are　ironic．　The　relevant　attitude　of　di8sociation　appear8　not　in　higher－
level　explicature　but　in　implicature，8ince　it　i8　not　to　the　propo8ition　expres8ed　by　the
utterance　but　to　the　source　of　the　thougllt　eclloed，
4，　Conclu8ion
　　　　　Carston（2000，2002）makes　it　clear　that　irony　has　no　basic　level　exphcature　but
doe8　have　80me　higher－level　explicatureB，　by　which　the　speaker　communicate8　the
attitude　ofdis80ciation，　As　the日bove　two　counter－examples　show，　not　every　iroIly　lacks
ba8ic　level　explicature，　and　higher－level　explicature　of　irolly　is　Ilot　always　optimally
relevant　to　the　hearer．　In　casee　where　all　utterance重n　irony　has　no　ba8ic　Ievel．
explicature，　which　mean8　the　attitude　of　dissociation　to　the　proposition　expressed　is
communicated，　the　relevant　attitude　of　irony　will　come　out　in　higller－level　explicature．
On　the　other　hand，　when　the　dis80ciative　attitude　is　not　to　the　proposition　expressed，
it　apPears　in　ilnplicatures．　So，　it　seems　inapPropriate　to　gay　that　every　irony　has駐o
ba8ic　level　explicature　alld　only　higller－level　explicature8，　The　relevant　attitude
appear8　either　in　higher脚level　eXplieaturds　or　in　inlplicature8，　depending　on重ndividual
ca8es　of　irony
＜Note8＞
ISee　Happ6（1993）and　Gibb8（2000）．
21n　relevance　theory，　the1・e　are　three　levels　of　lneallings：mainl｝～decoded　meaning　of
utterance8，　explicatures（the　propo8itionexpressed　by　the　utterance）and　implicatures，
The　difference　betweenexplicatures　and　implicature8　is　the　way　of　deriving　them．
Explicatures　are　recovered　by　decoding　and　pragmatic　inference，　while　implicatures
are　only　pragmatic　infbrence（see　Carston（2000，2001，2002＞ill　detai1）．
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3Explicature　ha8　two　level8：ba8ic　level　explicature　and　higher－level　explicature．　Ba8ic
level　explicature　and　the　proposition　exple88ed　by　the　utterance　are　almo8t　the　8ame・
They　bave　oniy　one　d重脆rence，　which　i8　that　ba8ic　level　explicature　i8　communicated
while　the　proposition　expres8ed　by　the　utterance　is　not，
4Thi8　utterance　comes　ffom　the　following　example：
　　　　　　　（112）（a）Peter：It’8　a　lovely　day　fbr　a　pienic．
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　IThey　go　fbr　a　picnic　and　it　rains．】
　　　　　　　　　　　（b）Mary（sarcastically）：It’s　a　lovely　day　f（）r　a　picnic，　indeed（Sperber
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　and　Wi180n，1995：p．239）．
5　T（）focus　on　higher－level　explicature8，　tasks　of　ba8ic　level　explicatures　are　omitted
here．
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